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In t roduct ion  
During the 1990s, educational performance tables became features of the educa- 
tional landscape in a number of countries. The intended goals of publishing these 
tables are to inform parents and students, support school improvement and enhance 
the accountability of schools. In this article, we explore the use and (negative) effects 
of the publication of performance tables in the United Kingdom and France. 1 We 
chose to focus on these countries because they both have considerable experience 
with the publication of school performance indicators. At the same time, the differ- 
ences between them in the ways in which schools are governed, in the amount of 
autonomy they enjoy and in the extent to which parents have choice make them 
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fruitful loci for a comparative study. We begin by examining the background and 
the content of the school performance indicators published in these two countries. 
Next, we offer a brief description of the problems associated with the publication 
of educational performance indicators. Finally, we discuss the effects of these indi- 
cators on parents and schools. 
School-performance indicators in the United 
Kingdom and France 
During the 1980s, the national press in the United Kingdom and in France began 
publishing what are known, respectively, as 'league tables' and 'palmar~s'. These 
tables rank schools on the basis of raw data, that is, the percentages of pupils who 
pass the school-leaving examinations at specified levels. In both countries the govern- 
ments reacted to these publications by issuing their own school performance indi- 
cators. These governmental reactions differed, however, in several essential respects. 
UNITED K I N G D O M  
In the United Kingdom, the performance indicators played an important role in the 
Conservative government's efforts to transform the education system into a market. 
The government claimed that applying market theories and enhancing choice would 
encourage schools to perform better and be more responsive to their consumers. In 
1992, the Office for Standards in Education (OFSTED) began to publish official 
school performance tables. While, unlike the unofficial league tables, these did not 
rank schools, they were also based on raw data--in this case, the unadjusted aver- 
age achievement scores on national tests and examinations. 
In England and Wales, the initial published school performance indicators were 
based on results from the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) exam- 
ination, taken at the end of compulsory schooling (at approximately age 16). To 
complete the GCSE, students take tests in a range of subjects, for which they are 
awarded grades from A (highest) to U (lowest). The school performance indicator 
for each secondary school was the percentage of students achieving five or more C 
grades, or above. In later years, school performance indicators were also published 
for other educational levels, based on the percentages receiving a certain grade in 
a given year on the national curriculum testing regime carried out at ages 7, 11 
and 14. 
FRANCE 
Meanwhile in France, the use of performance indicators was incorporated into the 
existing hierarchical administrative culture of governmental evaluation and account- 
ability. Le Monde de l'iducation [The world of education] published rough passing 
rates for the baccalaurdat (France's secondary school-leaving examination, gener- 
ally taken at age 18) for each lyc~e (an institution where students complete the final 
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three years of secondary schooling). Liensol & Meuret (1987) responded to this by 
demonstrating that school rankings based on value-added scores were significantly 
different from and more instructive than those based on rough scores. From 1989 
onward, value-added indicators were sent to lyc~es; since 1991, the Ministry of 
Education has published them more widely each year. The Ministry of Education 
report contains the rough success rates for the baccalaur6at together with an 'expected 
success rate' that is crudely calculated as a weighted sum of the national rates for 
each age and socio-economic group. The same kind of indicators for coll~ges (insti- 
tutions where students complete the first three years of secondary schooling) are 
considered confidential and are not open to the public. These are sent to schools in 
combination with other indicators that primarily describe student intake and staff 
characteristics. 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK: UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE 
Given the differences in historical background and political culture between the 
United Kingdom and France, the legal and institutional frameworks in which the 
development of public performance indicators is embedded is also different. In the 
United Kingdom, the right of parents to information has been more firmly entrenched 
in legislation and regulations since the Education Reform Act of 1988 and the Parents 
Charter of 1991. Conversely, in France, those who advocate the publication of 
performance indicators make reference to the Loi d'Orientation of 1989, a law that 
in fact does not contain any specific provisions on this subject. Indeed, schools in 
France do not have a specific obligation to provide data for the various performance 
indicators, although they all do comply, due to political and other governmental 
pressure. It is also worth noting that the job of gathering and processing the data 
has not been given to an 'independent' body in France but is carried out by a depart- 
ment of the Ministry of Education. 
Problems concerning the publ icat ion of school-  
performance indicators 
A scrutiny of the research literature and a discussion with experts in the United 
K~ngdom and France brings to light a number of problems concerning the publica- 
tion of performance data. These problems can be grouped into three categories: tech- 
nical-analytical problems, usability problems, and political-ethical and societal prob- 
lems. 
TECHNICAL-ANALYTICAL PROBLEMS 
This category of criticism of the publication of school performance indicators focuses 
on their reflectiveness of school quality: 
• Raw, uncontextualised, average student achievement scores, as originally 
published in the United Kingdom and a number of other countries, tell more 
Prospects, vol. XXXI ,  no. 2, June 2001 
242 S/oerd Karsten and Adrie Visscber 
about schools' catchment areas than about the quality of school processes and 
school performance. However, even when data are adjusted for student back- 
ground characteristics (e.g. socio-economic status, ethnicity, gender and attain- 
ment at prior educational stages), performance indicators are imprecise because 
of large confidence intervals. For one, these indicators often reflect the perfor- 
mance of a relatively small number of students. Only when performance indi- 
cator confidence intervals do not overlap with those of other schools (as is true 
for 10-20% of all schools), are there grounds for assuming one institution is 
better or worse than another (Goldstein, 1997). But even in these exceptional 
cases, there are alternate explanations for school performance levels. The prob- 
lem of large and overlapping confidence intervals is especially severe when 
assessing the performance of school departments or divisions, since they are 
often based on even smaller student numbers than whole-school indicators 
(Goldstein & Thomas, 1995). Thus, while value-added information is a precon- 
dition for comparisons between schools, it is not a sufficient one for knowing 
the true performance of all schools. 
Performance differences between schools cannot be accurately determined by 
means of a simple method even when attempting to adjust for all relevant 
factors. Full adjustment is simply impossible and each statistical estimation 
incorporates uncertainty. In the words of Rowe (1996) 'all rankings are falli- 
ble'. Assigning schools to groups and branding them as 'good', 'average', or 
'poor' can have adverse effects for many institutions, especially those falling 
close to a borderline of arbitrary categories. 
School quality indicators are mainly based on cohort data for those students 
who entered the school several years earlier. In the meantime, a school may 
have changed considerably, meaning that the indicators do not provide reli- 
able information on the quality of schools as they are at the time data are 
collected. These same factors make it even more difficult to project changes in 
future performance. Performance indicators may therefore be relatively unhelp- 
fill for parents interested in selecting schools for their children. 
It is difficult to assess the value added by a given school given fluctuations in 
the student populations. In areas where there are high levels of student mobil° 
ity (i.e., dropouts, movement to other schools), so that the final cohort ends 
up being quite different from the intake cohort, robust value-added indicators 
are usually not available. In those cases, school performance indicators are 
only based on those students who have been in school all the time or most of 
the time. However, information on the students who dropped out of the school 
system is also clearly relevant in assessing overall quality. 
Schools performing equally well on average, based on performance indicators, 
may exhibit considerable internal variation. Even in good schools with many 
high-quality instructors, teacher effectiveness varies (cf. Goldstein &: Thomas, 
1995; Luyten & Snijders, 1996). A given school may be extremely effective in 
certain subject areas and far less so in others. Furthermore, there may be consid- 
erable variation in the degree of effectiveness for certain student groups with 
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respect to gender, socio-economic or ethnic backgrounds. Thus, to deal with 
the many facets of school effectiveness, fine-grained indicators may be called 
for. Parents may want more specific information, such as how appropriate a 
given school would be for their child, or how strong a particular subject is (e.g., 
mathematics or the arts). A single and simple, valid school quality measure 
does not exist (Goldstein & Thomas, 1995). A convincing picture of a school's 
quality requires multiple process and output indicators (Schagen & Morrison, 
1999), which are not generally provided by published systems. 
Students from privileged socio-economic backgrounds often enter what are 
considered to be better schools and tend to have high levels of achievement 
upon enrolment. Thus, value-added adjustments for student intake features in 
these schools may actually lead to underestimation of their performance. 
In many education systems (including Dutch and French primary schools) there 
are no baseline assessments that would guarantee the option of comparing 
students at different schools. Where baseline assessments are conducted, they 
can lack validity because they do not encompass student performance in a suffi- 
cient number of subjects. The use of school-based assessments is not a good 
resolution to the problem because there is too much room for misconduct on 
the part of the schools (i.e. preparing students for tests or even fraud). There 
is also no way to make a real comparison between assessments provided by 
different schools. 
Whenever there are important differences between the public and private school 
sectors in terms of regulations, resources, recruitment of personnel and admis- 
sion of pupils, comparisons between these types of schools can easily lead to 
unfair treatment of the public sector. To avoid this, all relevant factors must 
be taken into account. 
Although value-added school performance indicators provide information on 
the relative performance of schools, they do not indicate the degree to which 
schools meet certain absolute educational standards (TIMMS, 1999). 
USABILITY PROBLEMS 
This category relates to the extent to which school performance indicators can be 
used in various user contexts (i.e. by schools, policy makers, parents and pupils) for 
well-informed involvement and decision making, school improvement and to enhance 
accountability. The evidence is against the effectiveness of school performance indi- 
cators in keeping parents and students up to date and enabling them to make well- 
informed choices. 
• Accessibility of public school performance publications is not equally distrib- 
uted across all parents. In the United Kingdom, even after many years of publish- 
ing school league tables, a considerable percentage of parents, especially from 
low socio-economic groups, remain unaware of their existence. Moreover, the 
indicators are not readily intelligible to all parents, making careful interpreta- 
tion of already questionable standards even more implausible. 
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There is serious doubt regarding their real value in determining the current and 
future overall quality of a school, the quality of particular aspects of the school 
and the appropriateness of a school for a given child. For all these reasons, 
school performance indicators, which are unequally distributed because of the 
size and nature of educational supply, transportation costs, social factors and 
cultural differences, have not proven to be effective in providing students and 
parents with real freedom of choice. 
It is doubtful that the publication of performance indicators actually stimu- 
lates schools to improve their functioning. Schools that are already perform- 
ing well do not need the encouragement these indicators could offer, while the 
schools most in need of support are more likely to find their publication discour- 
aging, especially from non-value-added systems. 
Schools in need of support are often unable to make constructive use of the 
information they have been given because reports of performance indicators 
most often neither define the cause of problems nor outline solutions. 
Finally, it is not always viable for schools to be expected to organize them- 
selves more effectively. To a large degree, what is possible depends on the local 
context (Hannaway, 1993; Hannaway 8c Talbert, 1993). Decentralized labour 
relations (as exist in the United States) or an unbalanced labour market of 
teachers (e.g. in the Netherlands) can influence whether schools are able to 
reorganize educational provisions. 
POLITICAL-ETHICAL AND SOCIETAL PROBLEMS 
A number of political-ethical and societal problems result from the publication of 
performance indicators: 
• Performance indicators are flawed and may be inaccurate. Given the potential 
for harm to at least some institutions, it would be morally troubling to publish 
indicators when their accuracy is in question. 
• Once data have been collected and compiled, it is paternalistic to then decide-- 
as is done in some countries--that only certain stakeholders (for instance, 
schools or policy-makers) and not others can have access to them. 
• The 'naming and shaming' approach, in accordance with which some schools 
are labeled as 'failing' to exert market-like pressures, can have negative conse- 
quences for an education system as a whole. Some schools will unavoidably 
receive lower ranks than others, so some will necessarily fall at the bottom. A 
ranking system obscures the fact that what matters most is not where schools 
rank but whether or not they meet the standards considered as important. 
• Computing meaningful performance indicators requires spending public money 
on the building and maintaining of large data banks. In turn, the publication 
of these ratings is expensive,.while the resulting revenues are uncertain. 
• The publication of school performance indicators poses in especially stark form 
the question of the relationship between the parallel goals of evaluation and 
improvement. Without external pressures exerted by the market and by the 
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public (perhaps motivated by the availability of performance indicators), schools 
may be less inclined to make improvements in light of performance evalua- 
tions (though some schools do improve in response to confidential performance 
reviews). On the other hand, however, schools, like other public sector orga- 
nizations, may react to the publication of performance indicators by focusing 
their efforts primarily not on the improvement of educational quality but on 
raising their public performance rankings. 
The ef fects of p u b l i c a t i o n  on parents and schools 
It is important to note that the consequences of public school performance indica- 
tors are not a function of the indicators alone, but also of the interaction between 
four groups of factors: 
• The nature of  the information publisbed; for instance, raw school performance 
scores may have a stronger negative impact than value-added data, and publi- 
cations may differ in the extent to which they define the problem or outline 
the remedies (global versus detailed information); 
• The way in which the information is fed back to intended users; for instance, 
whether they are accompanied by explanations of what the data mean and 
how they may be used, or whether complicated indicators are used in combi- 
nation with a 'drop and run' strategy; 
• The degree to which intended users are free to choose. This includes both the 
nature of the local school market and the school alternatives available to parents 
and students when they determine that their schools are not performing well; 
• Actions taken by the system: the extent to which systems take action to correct 
poorly performing schools, and the nature of this action. 
In this article we shall mainly limit ourselves to the first two groups of factors influ- 
encing the impact of school performance indicators on parents and schools. 
Parents 
Broadly speaking, parents and students have two courses of action open to them if 
the quality of a public service is found wanting. Using Hirschmann's (1970) terms, 
parents have: 
1. the exit optionL-that of looking for an alternative provider who can provide 
a better service; 
2. the voice option--that of appealing directly to the institution providing the service. 
Hirschmann's third category, the loyalty option, would apply when people are satis- 
fied with the quality of the service, or they are especially loyal to a particular provider 
for reasons such as religion. Hirschmann--who focuses on the ways consumers 
respond to a deterioration in the quality of production of goods and services-- 
explains that the option to which consumers appeal depends not only on the choices 
available to them but also on the characteristics of the consumers themselves. The 
exit and voice options, for instance, are determined by economies of scale, legal 
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opportunities, spatial barriers, information asymmetry and the income and educa- 
tion of consumers (Paul, 1991). 
The research into the responses of parents to the publication of school perfor- 
mance data in the United Kingdom and France has not been thorough enough. Most 
research has focused on the freedom parents and students have to choose schools, 
as part of broader studies on increasing school choice that have been conducted in 
both countries since the early 1980s. 
FRANCE 
In France, there is currently a limited amount of school choice. In the early 1960s, 
the carte scolaire (literally 'school map') policy took away the right to choose, requir- 
ing students to attend specific schools in their districts. The policy was intended to 
promote better central planning and to counteract geographical differences and 
disparity in quality between schools. In response to major demonstrations against 
the socialist government's 1984 plans to abolish the specific status of private schools, 
experiments with limited school choice were introduced. Parents began to be given 
the possibility of choosing from several schools within a geographical area. This 
semi-experimental policy of desectorization has been systematically extended and 
broadened and currently covers approximately one-half of all secondary schools in 
France. (The Ministry of Education, however, has been unwilling to provide exact 
figures.) 
A number of French studies (Ballion, 1986, 1989, 1991; Broccolichi &: Van 
Zanten, 1997; Pincon & Pincon-Carlot, 1989) have shown that the behaviour of 
families in relation to school choice varies according to social class. 
People higher on the socio-economic scale have a broader choice of 'good' 
schools and worthwhile curricula options than the middle (or lower) classes. This 
is largely a result of geographic location. In Paris, for instance, the highest concen- 
tration of very good lyctes is in the wealthier fifth and sixth districts. In these kinds 
of areas, school selection is most often based on school selectivity indicators. School 
choice in more socially heterogeneous, 'middle class' areas (where there are fewer 
'good' schools to choose from) is based on a wider variety of strategies. Some parents 
try to have their children excepted from the school map, perhaps by choosing unusual 
subject combinations for their studies, thus enabling them to attend schools outside 
of their own districts. Some try to make arrangements with school principals and 
some even resort to fraud, such as using false addressed. Publications dealing with 
school quality appear to be the most important for this segment of the population. 
Survey results show that people in the lowest social classes generally make the 
least amount of effort to enrol their children in better schools (Ballion, 1986, 1991). 
This is for obvious reasons. People in this group generally have less time, energy and 
resources available to them. They are less likely to have the means to live in better 
neighbourhoods or even to transport their children to better schools farther away. 
Moreover, they are also less likely to be informed about the quality of schools and 
the possibilities for choice. Where people in this group do make efforts to avoid 
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certain schools, the reasons have more to do with student composition and issues 
such as violence at school rather than educational quality. 
THE UNITED K I N G D O M  
Although the term 'choice' is absent from British education law (Morris, 1995), all 
reforms since the 1980s stress parental choice. Section 6 of the 1980 Education Act 
imposes a duty upon every local education authority (LEA) to make arrangements 
for parents to express their preferences regarding the schools their children attend. 
Furthermore, an LEA must honour a parental preference except when a school: 
• has reached its enrolment capacity (this exception was subsequently refined in 
1988 and 1998 to avoid arbitrariness in admission policies); 
• is a denominational or charitable institution and the prospective student is not 
affiliated with the sponsoring organization; 
• is selective and the applicant does not meet the selection criteria (about 5 % of 
secondary schools are selective 'grammar schools'). 
In 1989, the courts ruled that parents cannot be forced to send their child to local 
schools within particular catchment areas (Woods, Bagley & Glatter, 1998). 
Nonetheless, in the United Kingdom, schools generally admit pupils based on 
social selection in response to market forces in the education sector, of which league 
tables are a component. In response to these tables, middle-class parents, in partic- 
ular, work hard to ensure that high-scoring schools admit their children. Of note, 
performance as measured by examination results appears to be only one of many 
factors parents consider when choosing schools. While a large proportion of parents 
find published performance indicators useful, the extent to which a school is 'child- 
centred' seems to be more important to parents than the extent to which it is focused 
on academic achievement--as evinced by examination performance data (Woods, 
Bagley & Glatter, 1998). 
Despite the availability of opportunities for choice, many parents, especially 
among the lower classes, seem unaware of publications that might help them assess 
school performance (Foxman, 1997). Some researchers (West, Pennel & Noden, 
1997, 1998) have proposed various methods to achieve more objective and fair 
admission procedures with equal school choice opportunities for all pupils and 
parents. 
The ways in which parents choose schools and schools admit pupils in an educa- 
tional environment with haarket features tend to reinforce inequalities between 
schools and between families (Gewirtz, Ball & Bowe, 1995). An important ques- 
tion is to what extent the government can (and should) use regulation to counter- 
act the negative byproducts of an education system geared to educational consumerism. 
S c h o o l s  
Woods, Bagley & Glatter (1998) present a framework for analysing how schools 
may respond to changes in the local 'market' (that is, other schools, parents and 
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pupils) in which they operate. They distinguish the following responses: (a) promo- 
tional activities to present the school in the best light possible; (b) environmental 
scanning to gain better understanding of their own potential position within the 
'market'; (c) substantive changes in the curriculum, the mission, the composition of 
the pupil population (through admission criteria), as well as reorganization and 
acquisition of new equipment; (d) structural changes in the administration or status 
of the school; and finally (e) changes in resource management (personnel policy). 
Similar responses can be expected to the publication of comparative school perfor- 
mance data, especially when existing relationships are affected, for example, if a 
school in a very competitive environment emerges as significantly better or worse 
than others. The pressure to respond will, therefore, vary according to the size and 
nature of the local market. 
In addition to market incentives, a great deal also depends on the powers of 
the LEAs and OFSTED. If they react to the published data or make use of them in 
some way, schools will be more ready to respond. 
FRANCE 
Looking at the situation in France, we must point out, first of all, that differences 
between schools in France are not something new, certainly not in the big cities where 
for years certain lycdes have prided themselves for their outstanding reputations and 
their roles as producers of France's elite. These lyc~es have practised selection for 
years, both in their admissions policy and in their behaviour toward students through- 
out the education process. What has changed is that since the 1980s, other schools 
have adopted strategies to 'regulate' their intake, within the limited opportunities 
available to them, and to satisfy parents who are increasingly behaving as consumers 
(Ballion, 1989). The best-known ways of doing so are the establishment of streams 
or 'elite' classes, offering unusual subiects (e.g. Russian), the closing of unpopular 
departments, focused examination preparations and the exclusion of 'difficult' pupils. 
The extent to which these strategies are being encouraged by the publication of perfor- 
mance data on schools is not easy to demonstrate. Nonetheless, it is obvious that the 
annual publications, including those showing the added value offered by schools, 
certainly do not do anything to reduce the negative processes described above. 
THE UNITED K I N G D O M  
Research on school responses to performance indicators in the United Kingdom also 
shows that these are strongly dependent on local market characteristics (e.g. the 
degree of competitiveness between schools) and on the activities of the various parties 
(e.g. the LEAs and OFSTED). Observed school responses largely fall into two cate- 
gories: promotional activities and substantive changes. 
In order to 'inform' parents and pupils many schools are spending a good deal 
of money on promotional activities or marketing (Woods, Bagley 8c Glatter, 1998; 
Gewirz, Ball &: Bowe, 1995), often producing expensive, glossy brochures. Schools 
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produce this promotional information despite common sense understanding and 
research results (Ball & Vincent, 1998) demonstrating that the reputations of schools 
depend more on social networks. Information gained socially is clearly the most 
valued and most crucial for consumers in their choice making. 
Substantive changes made by school systems rarely focus on the curriculum and 
the primary process. The most important substantive changes are those geared toward 
influencing pupil intake. As Ball (1999, p. 93) puts it: 'it is not so much what the 
school can do for its students but what the students can do for their school.' Because 
disruptive pupils can affect the learning of a large proportion of a class, schools are 
more inclined to exclude them. According to Gillborn (1996), the graph of perma- 
nent exclusions shows a considerable steepening of the gradient of increase in the 
year the league tables were first published. Other 'improvement' strategies are deny- 
ing pupils entrance to exams when they are deemed unlikely to achieve high scores. 
Sometimes students are even denied access to a GCSE-course, told they cannot increase 
the number of subjects taken, or encouraged to include subjects which are regarded 
as less difficult (Foxman, 1997). Based on the literature, the most frequently noted 
effect of league tables on secondary schools is that of targeting those pupils likely to 
be at the GCSE-grade C/D borderline for a particular subject (Fitz-Gibbon, 1996; 
Gray, 1996; Ball, 1999). Foxman (1997), however, remarks that it is not clear in 
how many schools this happens, and to what extent it is at the expense of other pupils. 
The other possible school responses mentioned by Woods, Bagley & Glatter 
(1998), 'environmental scanning', 'structural changes in the administration or 
status of the school', and 'different personnel policy', were scarcely found if at 
all. Within the English context of promoting market ideology, it is striking that 
schools are emphasizing educational performance above all and are paying less 
attention to child-centredness, the very thing that appears to be more important 
to parents. 
C o n c l u s i o n s  
As we have shown, the publication of school performance data raises serious tech- 
nical-analytical, usabili~, and political-ethical and societal problems. Those who 
defend the computation and publication of school performance indicators often argue 
that they enable parents and students to be better informed about educational insti- 
tutions and thus help them make knowledgeable choices among schools. Research 
on how parents a.nd pupils in the United Kingdom and France choose schools does 
not demonstrate conclusively that the publication of school performance data has a 
major influence for most parents on the school choices of families, for several reasons: 
• A significant proportion of parents do not realize that school performance data 
are available or cannot readily obtain these data; 
• Understanding school performance data requires a degree of training many 
parents may not possess; 
• It is not always easy for parents to use school performance data in ways rele- 
vant to the circumstances and needs of their own children; 
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• Even when parents do understand school performance data, they cannot always 
make use of these data because alternatives are limited (due to geographical 
boundaries, limited provision or formal and material constraints); 
• Focus is primarily on the exit option while opportunities to use the voice option 
remain unexploited. 
Nonetheless, middle-class and upper-class parents (the ones who buy the news- 
papers in which school performance data are published) in France and the United 
Kingdom do use published performance data. These parents (especially middle-class 
parents living in socially mixed areas where there has traditionally been little diver- 
sity of school choice) generally invest more time, energy and resources than lower- 
class parents in selecting schools for their children. Their investment also extends 
over a longer period of time: if, for whatever reason, they do not get their first choice 
of school, they persist longer in trying to get around the situation. 
Especially in school systems where there are significant formal and/or mater- 
ial limits to educational provision, the middle-class parents who seem to be the most 
influenced by school performance indicators may engage in a variety of inappro- 
priate behaviours. They may use false addresses; seek to position their children as 
interested in unusual subjects (or subject combinations) to increase their chances of 
admission to higher-rated schools; demand streamed homogeneous classes for their 
children; andprotest against allocations. It is reasonable to expect comparable behav- 
iour on the part of similarly situated parents in other countries. We can be certain, 
in any case, that middle-class parents will make more use of performance data than 
lower-class parents and will be more equipped to take advantage of school choice 
options. We can also be confident that they will be more likely than lower-class 
parents to demand streaming or tracking in schools. 
Even though there are widespread doubts about the usefulness of the published 
performance indicators currently available, schools do try to find strategies to improve 
their reputation or position in the rankings. A common strategy is to regulate student 
intake. Private schools and selective public schools have always been free, in general, 
to admit students on the basis of their academic abilities. Now, however, previously 
non-selective public schools are now attempting to increase the proportions of acad- 
emically capable students they admit, and thus their position in the rankings, by 
initiating streaming or 'elite' classes. Other possibilities with similar effects include 
the creation of unusual subject options (as is done in France); the development of 
focused examination preparation programmes; the concentration of instructional 
time and resources on 'borderline' pupils, in a kind of academic sorting; and the 
exclusion of 'difficult' pupils. The short-term effects on performance levels possible 
through such strategies do not outweigh the more long-term negative consequences. 
Again, we suspect that parallel phenomena will be evident in other countries in 
which school performance indicators are published. 
The publication of school performance indicators causes a variety of problems. 
It is unlikely that current performance assessment programmes will contribute posi- 
tively to the improvement of school performance. 
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N o t e  
This study was commissioned by the Dutch Advisory Council for Education, the most 
important body advising the Dutch government on educational matters. The publica- 
tion by a number of newspapers (beginning in 1997) of data on school performance 
collected in the course of state inspections of primary and secondary schools served as 
the initial impetus for the study. In the meantime, the Office for Standards in Education 
has also started publishing so-caUed school quality cards. 
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